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ABSTRACT
We investigate whether, and to what extent, 
Nozick’s entitlement theory and Rawls’s theory 
of justice as fairness can normatively ground 
affirmative action policies. Our findings are 
that, whereas the Nozickean project offers no 
guidance for large-scale redress, the Rawlsian 
position supports affirmative action as redress, 
but only in its softer forms. Therefore, if one 
accepts the assumptions of equal liberty and 
fairness upon which Rawls’s theory is based, 
one is left with two alternatives: either to reject 
Rawls’s theory because it fails to support quota 
systems, or to accept Rawls’s theory and reject 
quota systems as a legitimate form of redress. 
We argue for the latter option.
Keywords: 
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INTRODUCTION
Twenty years after the advent of democracy, 
and despite sustained economic growth 
during the post-apartheid period (Lundahl & 
Petersson, 2009:22), South Africa remains rent 
by vast inequalities in income, education, and 
access to resources and services. While there is 
some evidence that there has been progress in 
reducing inequality between population groups 
in areas such as income distribution (Van der 
Berg, 2011:128; Lundahl & Petersson, 2009:8) 
and access to basic services (Seekings, 2007:22), 
the pace of change remains frustratingly slow, 
and levels of interracial inequality remain 
extremely high (Leibbrandt et al., 2012:33).
In particular, the pattern of income distribution 
and employment in South Africa remains 
tied to the hierarchy of racial classification 
institutionalised by the apartheid government. 
Whites continue to top the pay scale, followed 
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by Indians and coloureds, with black aggregate 
earnings remaining the lowest (Van der Berg, 
2011:121-122). According to the South African 
Institute of Race Relations, in 2011, “the median 
monthly wage for African earners was R2  380, 
for coloured earners R3 030, for Indian earners 
R6  800, and for white earners R10  000” (2013a) 
and black employees remained woefully under-
represented in senior management (2013b:254). 
Levels of unemployment follow similar 
patterns – in 2009, “narrow unemploy ment 
was 28.8   per cent for blacks, against 4.6  per 
cent for whites; coloureds (21.6%) and Indians 
(12.7%) occupied intermediate positions” (Van 
der Berg, 2011:127).1 It is indisputable that the 
racial discrimination legally entrenched by the 
colonial and Union governments2 and under the 
apartheid regime3 contributed greatly to this 
pattern of inequality (Van der Berg, 2011:120; 
Seekings, 2007:2).
Addressing these disparities in income and 
employment has been a major concern of 
government since 1994, and affirmative action 
has been introduced as part of an arsenal of socio-
economic policies directed towards this goal, 
given that “most income inequality originates 
in the labour market, through the distribution 
of jobs and the wage formation process” (Van 
der Berg, 2011:133). Notably, affirmative action, 
under the Employment Equity Act of 1998, is 
explicitly referred to as a form of “redress” for 
the “disparities in employment, occupation and 
income” that have resulted from “apartheid and 
other discriminatory laws and practices” (1998:1).
1 In 2011, blacks made up 79.2% of the national 
population, coloureds 8.9%, Indians 2.5 %, and 
whites 8.9 % (Van der Berg, 2011:17).
2 For example, the Mines and Works Act (1911), 
the Natives Land Act (1913), and the Natives 
(Urban Areas) Act (1923).
3 For example, the Group Areas Act (1950), the 
Black Building Workers Act (1951), the Black 
Labour Relations Regulation Act (Black Labour 
and Settlement of Disputes Act) (1953), the 
Industrial Conciliation Act (Labour Relations 
Act) (1956), and the Environmental Planning 
Act (1967).
Legally prescribed affirmative action clearly 
influences how businesses4 (may) operate 
in post-apartheid South Africa. In other 
words, affirmative action amounts to state 
interference in the employment practices of 
business, which is motivated by the need to 
reduce inequality and to bring about more 
equitable representation in the workplace. State 
interference in business activities in order to 
reduce inequality may be merited if we accept 
that (at least some) businesses have some degree 
of moral culpability for previous injustices that 
resulted in inequality, or, at minimum, that 
businesses operating under apartheid benefited 
from these historical injustices. The Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission institutional 
hearings on the role played by business during 
apartheid found that “most businesses benefited 
from operating in a racially structured context”, 
and that certain sectors, such as the mining 
industry, “were involved in helping to design 
and implement apartheid policies” (1998:58). 
The broad nature of these findings have been 
criticised for their “blunt, systemic, view of the 
relationship between business and apartheid”, 
and for failing to pay sufficient attention 
to “gradations of moral behaviour under 
apartheid” (Nattrass, 1999:381). However, this 
does not entirely undermine the idea that at 
least some businesses have some degree of moral 
responsibility for post-apartheid inequality, 
or at least benefited from the unjust policies 
that contributed towards this inequality, and 
therefore have a corresponding moral obligation 
to contribute towards its rectification.
Even if we reject this conclusion, business may 
nonetheless have a moral duty to take action to 
reduce inequality in employment and income. 
This is because, as agents with great social 
power, it is generally accepted that business 
has a moral responsibility towards society in 
4 Currently, the Employment Equity Act is applied 
to businesses with more than 50 employees or 
whose annual turnover is more than that set 
down in Schedule 4 of the Act (1998:3).
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general – in other words, to all stakeholders 
who can affect or be affected by business 
operations – and not only to shareholders. This 
includes both negative responsibilities (a duty 
to refrain from causing harm to society) and 
positive responsibilities (a duty to contribute 
actively to the good of society). This assertion 
would not exclude businesses that clearly 
have no moral culpability for apartheid, such 
as those established after 1994. In addition, 
business may have good instrumental reasons 
for wishing to see inequality reduced, given 
that on-going economic inequality contributes 
towards political instability, which, in turn, has 
a negative impact upon financial development 
(Roe & Siegel, 2011).
Even if we accept that it is imperative to rectify 
inequalities resulting from past injustice, and 
that business has a role to play here, the question 
remains whether affirmative action is a morally 
appropriate means to achieve this goal. This 
remains controversial, and is frequently the 
topic of public debate. In this paper, we seek to 
examine this question by investigating possible 
normative grounds for affirmative action as 
redress for past injustice.5 We will do so by 
evaluating the possible implications of two 
paradigmatic theories of distributive justice, 
namely Robert Nozick’s entitlement theory of 
justice and John Rawls’s theory of justice as 
fairness. These two distributive models have 
been highly influential in twentieth century 
political philosophy, providing theoretical 
grounding for libertarianism and liberalism 
5 As we are focusing here on interracial inequality 
in income distribution and employment resulting 
from historical racial discrimination, we will 
only examine justifications for race-based 
affirmative action. In other words, we do not 
focus on other forms of affirmative action that 
are included under the Employment Equity Act, 
such as affirmative action in favour of women or 
people with disabilities, although it is possible 
that our argument may also have implications 
for these forms of affirmative action.
respectively.6 If we are unable to find grounds 
for affirmative action in either of these two 
theories, which offer competing normative 
frameworks for thinking about economic 
justice, this may imply that there is insufficient 
justification for affirmative action (at least 
as a form of redress), or that an alternative 
theoretical framework must be found in order 
to provide such justification.
ENTITLEMENT, RESTITUTION, 
AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
It may seem odd to seek normative justification 
for affirmative action in the work of Robert 
Nozick. Nozick is, after all, a libertarian who 
argues in Anarchy, State, and Utopia that “the 
minimal state is the most extensive state that 
can be justified”, and that “any state more 
extensive violates people’s rights” (1974:149). It 
therefore seems unlikely that one could discover 
in Nozick moral grounds for affirmative action, 
which entails extensive state interference in the 
employment practices of business.
Aside from the libertarian rejection of any 
state intervention beyond the protective 
services of the minimal state, it also seems 
likely that Nozick would take issue with the 
goals of affirmative action. The Employment 
Equity Act in South Africa is directed towards 
upsetting or revising the “disparities in 
employment, occupation and income within 
the national labour market” (1998:1), and seeks 
to bring about a less racially skewed and more 
egalitarian pattern of distribution. In other 
words, the current pattern of distribution and 
disadvantage is seen as undesirable, and a more 
equitable pattern of distribution is sought. 
However, Nozick rejects “patterned principles 
of distributive justice” that consider the “total 
6 While we choose to focus on these two theories 
because of their profound influence, we 
acknowledge that other theories of distributive 
justice, for example, communitarian theories, 
are available. It is beyond the scope of this paper 
to explore these alternative theoretical models.
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picture of holdings” (1974:168). For Nozick, what 
matters is not the overall pattern of distribution 
in society, but rather whether each individual is 
entitled to what he or she has. As long as this 
is the case, any pattern of distribution is just, 
and there can be no justification for attempts 
to bring about (or maintain) a more egalitarian 
distributive pattern in society, as this would 
involve interfering in the free economic choices 
of individuals.
However, a Nozickean justification for affirma-
tive action may possibly be found in the principle 
of “rectification of injustice in holdings” 
(1974:152).7  Despite Nozick’s rejection of any 
patterned (re)distribution of holdings, he follows 
this rejection with an important parenthesis: 
“An exception is those takings that fall under 
the principle of the rectification of injustices” 
(1974:168). In order to interrogate whether 
affirmative action could be justified as just such 
an exception, we must provide a short overview 
of Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice.
As described above, Nozick rejects any patterned 
principle of distributive justice. Rather, he 
argues for an entitlement theory of justice, 
which is historical, and which is concerned, 
not with a desired pattern of distribution, but 
rather with whether each individual is entitled 
to what he or she has. The entitlement theory is 
composed of three principles. Each individual is 
entitled to what he or she has, if: (1)  a holding 
arises from a just original acquisition, or (2)  a 
holding arises from a just transfer. The third 
principle  (3) states that nobody is entitled to 
any holding that was not acquired in accordance 
with (1) or (2) (Nozick, 1974:151). Any pattern 
of distribution is just (no matter how unequal), 
as long as holdings have been acquired and 
transferred justly. As long as this is the case, any 
redistribution is morally illegitimate, including 
redistribution to bring about a more egalitarian 
distribution, as this would deprive individuals, 
whose holdings are redistributed, of what they 
are entitled to.
7 Such a move is not unprecedented – see, for 
example, Valls (1999).
However, this does not seem to imply that 
redistribution in the South African context is 
necessarily morally illegitimate. Indeed, such 
redistribution may be required as a matter of 
justice under the entitlement theory. It is the 
third principle that is relevant here. Where 
holdings in society have been acquired or 
transferred in a way that is incompatible with 
principles (1) and (2), entitlement is absent. In 
other words, Nozick acknowledges that:
Not all actual situations are generated in 
accordance with the two principles of justice in 
holdings: the principle of justice in acquisition 
and the principle of justice in transfer. Some 
people steal from others, or defraud them, 
or enslave them, seizing their product and 
preventing them from living as they choose, 
or forcibly exclude others from competing in 
exchanges. (1974:152)
In such situations, Nozick sanctions a principle 
of rectification. According to this principle, 
historical injustices in the acquisition and 
transfer of holdings must be rectified. To the 
extent that it is possible, we should try to 
bring about the situation (the distribution of 
holdings) that would have obtained, had the 
injustice not occurred (1974:153). If we agree 
that legally sanctioned racial discrimination 
during the colonial era and under apartheid 
gave rise to the flouting of the principles of 
justice in acquisition and transfer, then the 
resultant pattern of distribution that we are 
left with is unjust. Examples abound of this 
kind of racial discrimination in South African 
history. Aside from the questionable original 
acquisition of land by white settlers, and the 
long history of interpersonal discrimination, 
which undermined fair economic competition, 
legally sanctioned policies such as racially 
based land tenure (including forced removals) 
and job reservation would undoubtedly have 
flouted Nozick’s principles of just acquisition 
and transfer. If these injustices had not occurred, 
we can assume that black South Africans, 
under conditions of fair competition, would 
have acquired a far greater share in the labour 
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market and the economy, and that the pattern 
of employment and income distribution would 
have looked quite different today.
If this is indeed the case, and if the principle of 
rectification requires that we ought to attempt 
to bring about the distribution of holdings that 
would have realised, had injustices not occurred, 
then extensive state intervention to bring 
about such a distribution could be warranted, 
even under libertarian theory, which holds 
that, in the normal run of things, “the minimal 
state is the most extensive state that can be 
justified” (1974:149). Nozick admits as much, 
acknowledging that “past injustices might be so 
great as to make necessary in the short run a 
more extensive state in order to rectify them” 
(1974:231). It seems that this is precisely the 
situation that we are faced with in South Africa.
The question remains, however, whether 
affirmative action is a morally appropriate 
method for the rectification of historical 
injustice under the entitlement theory of justice. 
On the face of it, it seems that this could be the 
case. Nozick’s full principle of rectification runs 
as follows:
This principle uses historical information 
about previous situations and injustices done 
in them (as defined by the first two principles 
of justice and rights against interference), 
and information about the actual course 
of events that flowed from these injustices, 
until the present, and it yields a description 
(or descriptions) of holdings in the society. 
The principle of rectification presumably will 
make use of its best estimate of subjunctive 
information about what would have occurred 
(or a probability distribution over what might 
have occurred, using the expected value) if 
the injustice had not taken place. If the actual 
description of holdings turns out not to be one 
of the descriptions yielded by the principle, 
then one of the descriptions yielded must be 
realized. (1974:152-153)
Affirmative action seems to be one way of 
achieving this (probably in conjunction with 
other sorts of interventions). As noted above, 
we can assume that, in the absence of the 
historical injustices perpetrated by the colonial 
and apartheid states, black South Africans 
would have acquired a far greater share in 
the labour market, and the inequalities in 
income distribution would have been far less. 
If affirmative action is able to bring about a 
situation in which previously dispossessed 
South Africans are better able to access the 
labour market and, particularly, management 
positions, along with the higher salaries that 
these positions attract, this would at least 
bring us closer to the situation (the pattern of 
distribution) that would have resulted in the 
absence of the identified historical injustices.8 
Note that this moral justification for affirmative 
action is not concerned with bringing about 
diversity in the workplace, because such 
diverse representation is valuable in itself (an 
argument which is frequently raised in favour 
of affirmative action in South Africa9). Rather, 
it focuses only upon rectifying historical 
injustices in the acquisition and transfer of 
holdings, and would therefore no longer be 
morally justified once this rectification has 
been achieved (in other words, once one of the 
descriptions of holdings that would have come 
about in the absence of historical injustice has 
been achieved).
It seems then that a prima facie case can be 
made for affirmative action in South Africa, 
based on the principle of rectification. However, 
there is a further objection to be considered. 
The entitlement theory of justice is focused on 
8 Of course, this assumes that affirmative action 
would indeed have this effect, rather than simply 
benefiting a small minority of black people 
who are already advantaged. This criticism was 
recently raised by Benatar, who argues that 
affirmative action in South Africa is “most likely 
to benefit those who were least disadvantaged” 
(2008:282). While this point deserves further 
consideration, space does not allow us to pursue 
this here.
9 For a discussion and critique of arguments for 
affirmative action that appeal to the value of 
diversity, see Benatar (2008:288-299).
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individual entitlement – Nozick’s argument is 
premised on the primacy of individual property 
rights. The goal of rectification, according to 
this theory, is to ensure that the holdings of 
individuals conform to what would have been 
the case in the absence of historical injustice 
in the acquisition and transfer of holdings. 
In other words, it seems that “Nozick would 
recognise only individuals, not groups, as 
legitimate victims” of injustice (Van Wyk, 
2001:181), and therefore that only individuals 
ought to be targeted for restitution under the 
principle of rectification. This also appears to 
be the implication of Nozick’s strong rejection 
of patterned principles of distribution. Group-
based affirmative action, which requires 
that members of designated groups be given 
preference, as practised in South Africa, 
seems to undermine this focus on individual 
entitlement. Does this mean that affirmative 
action cannot be considered an appropriate 
method for rectifying historical injustices in 
acquisition and transfer? In order to answer 
this question, we need to look at some of the 
practical difficulties in applying the principle of 
rectification under Nozick’s theory.
RECTIFICATION IN pRACTICE: 
BACK TO pATTERNED 
DISTRIBUTION?
While Nozick’s principle of rectification is 
theoretically simple – identify where historical 
injustices in acquisition and transfer have 
occurred, and ensure that they are rectified – 
in practice, the application of this principle is 
extraordinarily complex (Valls, 1999:301). This 
is especially the case in situations like the South 
African context, where innumerable injustices 
have occurred over a number of years, affecting 
vast swathes (indeed, the majority) of the 
population. The principle of rectification asks us 
to determine what pattern(s) would (probably) 
have occurred if these injustices had not 
taken place, and realise one of these patterns. 
However, if this requires us to determine what 
holdings individuals would have possessed in 
the absence of legally entrenched historical 
injustice in South Africa, this task seems to be 
so complex so as to be impossible. In some cases 
(for example, where forced removals took place), 
it is possible to identify specific victims who can 
be compensated. However, in terms of income 
and employment distributions, the multiple 
variables that have contributed towards the 
current state of affairs would be, for all intents 
and purposes, impossible to tease apart, and the 
impact upon the holdings of specific individuals 
would be impossible to quantify.
Unfortunately, Nozick provides little practical 
guidance as to how the principle of rectification 
should be applied. He leaves as open questions, 
for example, how far back we should go 
historically in terms of rectifying injustice, and 
how our obligations would differ in situations 
where descendants of the original beneficiaries 
and victims of injustice are involved, rather 
than the original actors, although he ventures 
that, ideally, “theoretical investigation will 
produce a [fully worked out] principle of 
rectification” (1974:152). However, he does 
acknowledge that there may be situations 
in which (a)  there are multiple possibilities 
for descriptions of holdings that could have 
occurred in the absence of historical injustice, 
which would be difficult to choose between 
(1974:153), or (b)  where historical information 
is insufficient to arrive at any full description of 
(individuals’) holdings as they would have been 
in the absence of historical injustice (1974:231). 
In these situations, however, it seems that 
libertarian theory, with its strong focus on 
individual property rights, offers us no solution. 
Rather, Nozick suggests that we would need to 
revert to the principled patterns of distribution 
that he previously strongly rejected. In the first 
case, where there are multiple descriptions 
of holdings that could have occurred in the 
absence of historical injustice, he suggests 
that we may need to choose between these on 
the basis of “considerations about distributive 
justice and equality that I argue against” 
65From inequality to equality
African Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 8 No. 2, November 2014, 59‑73
(1974:153). In the second case, where we lack 
sufficient historical information to determine 
the situation that would have pertained in the 
absence of historical injustice (which seems to 
be precisely the situation that we are faced with 
in South Africa), Nozick is forced to advocate 
for the adoption of Rawlsian principles which 
he has previously devoted a great deal of energy 
to debunking:
[A]ssuming that (1)  victims of injustice 
generally do worse than they otherwise would 
and (2)  that those from the least well-off group 
in the society have the highest probabilities of 
being the (descendants of) victims of the most 
serious injustice who are owed compensation 
... then a rough rule of thumb for rectifying 
injustices might seem to be the following: 
organize society so as to maximise the position 
of whatever group ends up least well-off in the 
society. (1974:231)
This may provide a justification for group-
based affirmative action in the South African 
context, as opposed to individual restitution, 
but, paradoxically, only if affirmative action can 
be justified by Rawlsian principles (a question 
we will turn to next). What the preceding 
discussion does seem to show, however, is that 
the entitlement theory of justice is unable to 
cope with situations where distribution has 
been heavily skewed by historical injustice, as 
is the case in South Africa, without abandoning 
(at least in the short term) its commitment to 
the minimal state and to sacrosanct individual 
property rights – in other words, to its own 
libertarian foundations. In these situations, 
the entitlement theory is forced to rely upon 
patterned principles of distributive justice that 
it has previously situated itself in opposition 
to. In other words, under Nozick’s theory, 
rectification is required in cases where it can 
be established that the principles of transfer 
and acquisition have been flouted. However, 
where we cannot identify precisely what the 
situation would have been in the absence of 
historical injustice, but it is clear that injustice 
has severely skewed the pattern of holdings in 
society, rectification may require that society 
should be organised “so as to maximise the 
position of whatever group ends up least well-
off” (Nozick, 1974:231). Therefore, in societies 
marred by historical injustice, like South Africa, 
Rawlsian principles (or some other patterned 
principles of distribution) must first be applied, 
before Nozickian recommendations as to the 
minimal state and the protection of individual 
property rights can be instituted. For the time 
being, therefore (until rectification has been 
achieved), Nozick’s entitlement theory of 
justice is of little use to us, as it cannot tell us 
how rectification ought to proceed without 
sacrificing its own premises.
THE RAWLSIAN VIEW OF JUSTICE 
AS FAIRNESS
Having demonstrated both why Nozick’s theory 
cannot ground a defence of affirmative action as 
a form of redress (and thus of distributive justice) 
without abandoning its libertarian foundations, 
and why the issue of such a defence cannot be 
side-stepped in the South African context, we 
now turn to the question raised above, namely 
whether affirmative action can be justified by 
Rawlsian principles.
Before addressing this question, however, it is 
necessary to provide background to Rawls’s 
conception of justice, as put forward in A 
theory of justice (1971/1999). For Rawls, justice 
primarily concerns the question of fairness, and 
in order to determine what fairness implies, we 
must place ourselves in “the original position 
of equality” (1999:11), understood as “a purely 
hypothetical situation characterized so as to 
lead to a certain conception of justice” (1999:11).
Rawls contends that our sense of justice is 
influenced by our position in society (which, in 
itself, is largely the outcome of natural chance 
and historical contingency). The only manner 
in which we can counteract our prejudices 
and partisan interests is by hypothetically 
placing ourselves behind the so-called “veil 
of ignorance” (1999:11). Behind the veil of 
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ignorance, we know nothing about ourselves 
or about our standing in society, which means 
that “all are similarly situated and no one is able 
to design principles that favour his particular 
position” (1999:11). Rawls therefore argues that 
we should choose the principles of justice in 
the original position, since it is “the appropriate 
original status quo” (1999:11), and is thus “an 
initial situation that is fair” (1999:11).
Rawls further postulates that, in the original 
position, we will act in a manner that is rational, 
conservative, and self-interested. In other 
words, we will not gamble with our futures, or 
sacrifice our interests for the interests of others. 
These conditions translate into a concern for 
the worst-off in society, as everyone would 
be worried that – once the veil is lifted – they 
would fall into this demographic. Given these 
basic shared views, Rawls argues that we would 
come to a consensus regarding two principles of 
justice: the first dealing with our basic liberties, 
and the second dealing with the distribution 
of wealth and income and institutional design. 
These principles read as follows:
First: each person is to have an equal right 
to the most extensive scheme of equal basic 
liberties compatible with a similar scheme of 
liberties for others.
Second: social and economic inequalities are to 
be arranged so that they are both (a)  reasonably 
expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and 
(b)  attached to positions and offices open to all. 
(Rawls, 1999:53)
Principle  1 is referred to as the Equal Liberty 
(EL) Principle, Principle  2 (a) is referred to as the 
Difference Principle (DP), and Principle  2 (b) is 
referred to as the Fair Equality of Opportunity 
(FEO) Principle. Rawls gives preference to the 
first principle, arguing that “infringements 
of the basic liberties protected by the first 
principle cannot be justified, or compensated 
for, by greater social and economic advantage” 
(1999:53-54).
One last important remark to be made before 
turning to the issue of affirmative action is 
that Rawls presents his theory of justice as 
ideal theory. This means that he examines the 
conditions for justice in circumstances where 
on-going injustices are absent, and where 
present distributions are not the outcome of 
specific historical contingencies such as social 
engineering (Taylor, 2009:479). With reference 
to Rawls’s conception of ideal theory, Thomas 
Nagel (2003:82) argues that ideal theory is 
helpful, in that it enables you to measure 
societies against the ideal of justice, and thereby 
allows you to characterise societies as unjust 
when they fall short of this ideal. However, 
Nagel also argues that ideal theory “does not 
tell you what to do if, as is almost always the 
case, you find yourself in an unjust society, 
and want to correct that injustice” (2003:82). 
This latter case falls within the scope of what 
Rawls terms “non-ideal theory”, which clearly 
encompasses questions regarding affirmative 
action, defined as a measure “to deal with the 
unjust consequences of an unjust history” 
(Nagel, 2003:82).
Rawls’s strict delineation between ideal and 
non-ideal theory explains why he never directly 
commentated on the justness of affirmative 
action, except for one passing comment on 
A theory of justice that appears in Justice as 
fairness: A restatement, which reads as follows:
The serious problems arising from existing 
discrimination and distinctions based on 
gender and race are not on its agenda ... This is 
indeed an omission in Theory; but an omission 
is not as such a fault ... Whether fault there be 
depends on how well that conception articulates 
the political values necessary to deal with these 
questions. Justice as fairness, and other liberal 
conceptions like it, would certainly be seriously 
defective should they lack the resources to 
articulate the political values essential to 
justify the legal and social institutions needed 
to secure the equality of women and minorities. 
(Rawls, 2001:66)
The question of whether affirmative action can be 
justified by Rawlsian principles therefore hinges 
on whether Rawls’s notion of justice as fairness 
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does indeed hold the resources for normatively 
grounding affirmative action, especially in the 
South African context, and it is this question 
that will guide the remainder of the analysis. 
This analysis – which will largely be informed 
by Robert Taylor’s detailed exploration of a 
Rawlsian perspective on affirmative action10 
– will focus on three aspects: the scope of 
affirmative action interventions; EL and FEO, 
and the logical ordering of these principles; and 
the limit-conditions of non-ideal theories and 
their consequences for assessing the outcomes 
of social policies, specifically affirmative action 
policies.
A RAWLSIAN pERSpECTIVE ON 
THE LEGITIMATE SCOpE OF 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Up to this point in the argument, affirmative 
action has been treated generically as a socio-
economic policy aimed at dismantling the 
entrenched patterns of racial inequality that 
characterise South African society in general, 
and the workplace in particular, and that are the 
legacy of the apartheid era. However, in order 
to determine whether Rawlsian principles can 
normatively ground these policies, it is necessary 
to distinguish between different categories of 
affirmative action. In this regard, we take as 
our lead Taylor’s (2009:478-479) adaptation of 
Nagel’s (1973:349-351, 356) taxonomy, which is 
cited below in condensed form:
10 The question of a Rawlsian account of affirmative 
action is not dealt with extensively in the extant 
literature. Apart from Robert Taylor’s analysis, 
which is summarised here, and Samuel Freeman’s 
short treatment of the problem in his book, titled 
Rawls (which is cited, in part, later on in this 
article), the only scholars to have published an 
extended treatment of the problem are Edwin 
Goff (1976) and Elisabeth Rapaport (1981). 
However, as pointed out by Taylor (2009:477), 
both these treatments are problematic, albeit 
for different reasons (namely, Goff’s neglect of 
Rawls’s partial-compliance applications and 
Rapaport’s failure to distinguish between ideal 
and non-ideal conditions).
 ▪ Category 1: Formal Equality of 
Opportunity: ...  requiring inter alia the 
elimination of legal barriers to persons 
of color, women, and so forth as well as 
the punishment of private discrimination 
against them.
 ▪ Category 2: Aggressive Formal Equality 
of Opportunity: self-conscious impartiality 
achieved through sensitivity training, 
external monitoring and enforcement, 
outreach efforts, and so forth as a possible 
supplement to category 1.
 ▪ Category 3: Compensating Support: special 
[measures] all designed to compensate for 
color- or gender-based disadvantage in 
preparation, social support, and so forth 
[in order] to help recipients compete more 
effectively.
 ▪ Category 4: Soft Quotas: ‘compensatory 
discrimination in the selection process,’ such 
as adding ‘bonus points’ to the selection 
of indices of persons of color or women in 
... hiring processes, but without the use of 
explicit quotas.
 ▪ Category 5: Hard Quotas: ‘admission [or 
hiring] quotas,’ perhaps ‘proportional to 
the representation of a given [historically 
oppressed] group in the population.’
The South African Employment Equity Act 
(1998) draws from most of these categories in 
framing its aims and its purpose, as set out in the 
Summary of the Employment Equity Act, 55 of 
1998, issued in terms of Section 25(1). Statements 
from the summary that substantively support 
these categories are provided below:
 ▪ Category 1: “The purpose of this act is 
to achieve equity in the workplace by 
promoting equal opportunity and fair 
treatment in employment through the 
elimination of unfair discrimination”; and, 
“Affirmative action measures implemented 
by a designated employer must include 
measures to identify and eliminate 
68 Susan Hall & Minka Woermann
employment barriers, including unfair 
discrimination, which adversely affect 
people from designated groups.”
 ▪ Category 2: “Affirmative action measures 
implemented by a designated employer 
must include measures in the workplace 
based on equal dignity and respect for 
all people.”
 ▪ Category 3: “Affirmative action measures 
implemented by a designated employer 
must include making reasonable 
accommodation for people from designated 
groups in order to ensure that they enjoy 
equal opportunities and are equitably 
represented in the workforce of a 
designated employer.”
 ▪ Category 4 and 5: “Affirmative action 
measures implemented by a designated 
employer must include measures (i.e. 
preferential treatment [category 4] and 
numerical goals [category 5]) to ensure 
the equitable representation of suitably 
qualified people from designated groups 
... and to retain and develop people from 
designated groups  ...”
In order to interrogate whether the Employment 
Equity Act can be justified according to 
Rawlsian principles, it is necessary to determine 
whether, and to what extent, Rawls’s theory 
can plausibly be used as normative support for 
these categories under both ideal and non-ideal 
circumstances.
Taylor (2009) argues that, given ideal circum-
stances, Category  1 affirmative action inter-
ventions will always be justified, due to FEO: 
FEO requires formal equality of opportunity, 
which means that, in principle, there should 
be no barriers to entry into the workplace 
(including barriers such as discrimination or 
monopolistic privileges). FEO also requires 
substantive equality of opportunity, which means 
that people of equal talent should have equal 
opportunities in life; and, furthermore, that it is 
the state’s role to facilitate equal opportunities. 
Although Category 2 interventions are more 
difficult to argue for under ideal circumstances, 
Taylor argues that these interventions would 
be justified only as a means to retain ideal 
conditions by preventing a backsliding into 
non-ideal past conditions (e.g., a history marred 
by racism and sexism), and by preventing 
certain current developments (e.g., large-scale 
immigration coupled with ethnic clumping in 
certain neighbourhoods) from leading to future 
non-ideal conditions. In ideal circumstances, 
Categories 3 to 5 interventions, however, 
threaten both formal and substantive FEO, and 
are therefore incompatible with Rawls’s theory. 
In this regard, Samuel Freeman (2007:91) – 
a Rawlsian scholar – states that:
under ideal conditions ... preferential treatment 
[is not] compatible with fair equality of 
opportunity. It does not fit with the emphasis 
on individuals and individual rights, rather 
than groups or group rights, that is central to 
liberalism.
What the above citation implies is that FEO is a 
necessary consequence of EL (which, to recall, 
is given lexical priority in Rawls’s ideal theory). 
If we affirm the liberal view that individuals 
have equal liberties, then we are also committed 
to endorsing socio-economic institutions that 
engender these liberties to the extent that they 
promote fair equality of opportunity to all – 
regardless of race, gender, class, etc. Under non-
ideal circumstances, however, the lexical priority 
of EL over FEO can, in some circumstances, be 
temporarily reversed, as argued below.
Rawls’s non-ideal theory is contingent on 
one of two specific conditions: either partial 
compliance, in which on-going systematic 
injustices are carried out in the private or 
public sphere, or an economic and/or cultural 
historical legacy that negatively impacts upon 
present conditions (Rawls, 1999:215). Given 
these adverse conditions, Taylor (2009) argues 
that it seems plausible that a case can be made 
(1)   to extend the scope of socio-economic policy 
beyond Category  2 interventions (which cannot 
address the legacy of past discrimination), 
69From inequality to equality
African Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 8 No. 2, November 2014, 59‑73
in order to safeguard the moral and political 
equality of designated groups; and, (2)   to 
reverse the order of EL over FEO (since, without 
substantive equality of opportunity, one can 
hardly claim equal liberty amongst people).
Taylor argues that the goal of non-ideal theory 
is to create a world in which ideal conditions 
can come about. However – in order to 
prevent non-ideal theory from functioning in a 
purely instrumental and utilitarian manner, in 
which questions of rightness and justness are 
sacrificed in the name of effectiveness – it is 
necessary to put certain constraints in place to 
ensure that the spirit of ideal theory is retained 
(even though the letter may be temporarily 
suspended).
Taylor follows Christine Korsgaard (1996) in 
her treatment of non-ideal theory, which is 
grounded in Rawls, but which also extends 
his position. In Creating the kingdom of ends, 
she identifies three conditions under which 
the lexical ranking of EL over FEO may be 
temporarily suspended, and which will ensure 
that “ideal [theory] will also guide our choice 
among nonideal alternatives” (Korsgaard, 
1996:157). These conditions are: (1)   the non-
ideal theory must be consistent with justice-
in-general, in which “the common good [is 
defined by] certain general conditions that are 
... equally to everyone’s advantage” (Rawls, 
1999:217-218); (2)   although the lexical order of 
EL over FEO may temporarily be reversed, any 
action must be undertaken with the goal of first 
securing EL (therefore preferencing FEO above 
EL is only justifiable if the goal is to promote 
EL); (3)   the non-ideal theory must be consistent 
with the spirit of ideal theory.
In order to assess Category 3 to 5 affirmative 
action interventions in light of these constraints, 
it is first necessary to elaborate on the third 
condition. To act consistently with the spirit of 
ideal theory implies that any means undertaken 
to secure ideal conditions must appeal to liberal-
democratic principles. Taylor (2009:490) argues 
that “permitting violations of the spirit of ideal 
theory in addition to its letter may ... lead us to 
ask whether the nonideal theory can be wedded 
to its deontological ideal-theory counterpart 
without fatal tension.” Otherwise put, violating 
the spirit of ideal theory constitutes a violation 
of procedural justice, which denotes “[a] fair 
procedure [that] translates its fairness to the 
outcome” (Rawls, 1999:75). If the procedure 
is not fair, then we have no guarantee of the 
fairness of outcome either (regardless of the 
goals that we set ourselves).
Applied to the categories of affirmative action, 
it stands to reason that Category 3 interventions 
are consistent with the spirit of ideal theory, 
since such interventions are aimed at liberating 
individuals by removing extraneous constraints 
that hamper fair competition. Drawing on 
Lyndon Johnson’s metaphor, Taylor (2009:492) 
argues that “category 3 interventions remove 
the weights from the legs of participants in a 
race rather than rigging its rules.” Category 4 
and 5 interventions, however, violate the spirit 
of ideal theory, in that procedural justice (and 
the demands of FEO) is suspended through the 
enforcement of soft and hard quotas, in order 
to attain certain outcomes. If a fair procedure is 
not followed, fairness in the outcome is also not 
guaranteed, and it would be inconsistent with 
Rawls’s theory to strive for fair outcomes whilst 
dismissing the need to establish fair conditions 
of competition.
The difficulty here is that we cannot know what 
a fair outcome would be, as a fair outcome is 
only guaranteed by a fair procedure. Category 
4 and 5 interventions (soft and hard quotas) 
are directed towards bringing about a fair(er) 
outcome in cases where that outcome cannot 
be brought about by the use of Category 1 
to 3 interventions alone. However, if these 
interventions are directed toward bringing about 
a fair outcome (in other words, a distribution 
that would have resulted in the absence of 
historical inequality), we must know what a fair 
outcome is, so that these interventions can be 
designed in such a way that they would indeed 
bring about, or contribute towards, this outcome 
– in this case, a just distribution in income 
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and employment. However, as stated above, 
“we cannot ... know what a just distribution 
looks like unless we have actually carried out 
a just procedure” (Taylor, 2009:493). Therefore, 
Category 4 and 5 interventions, in aiming for 
a particular outcome, would be illegitimate 
– it would not be clear that the outcome that 
these interventions are directed towards would 
indeed be fair, as a result of their suspension 
of procedural justice and our lack of knowledge 
about the “counterfactual results of a ‘clean’ 
competition” (Taylor, 209:494). The attempt to 
establish a Rawlsian justification for Category 
4 and 5 forms of affirmative action therefore 
finds itself faced with the same difficulty that 
we encountered in applying Nozick’s principle 
of rectification in the South African situation – 
we have insufficient knowledge about what the 
(fair) distributional situation would have been 
in the absence of historical injustice (in other 
words, had a fair procedure been followed).
The preceding analysis leads Taylor (2009:494) 
to conclude that:
rejigging competitive results on justice grounds 
is inevitably arbitrary and inconsistent with 
the spirit of FEO, at least if one accepts the 
interpretation of FEO as an application of pure 
procedural justice to the distributive domain of 
offices and positions, as Rawls very clearly does.
Therefore, whilst Rawls’s theory allows us to 
normatively ground the legal clauses in the 
Employment Equity Act (1998) that support 
Category 1 to 3 interventions, the logical 
consequences of his theory lead us to morally 
reject legal clauses based on Category 4 and 5 
interventions, i.e. soft and hard quotas.
CONCLUSION
In the foregoing analysis, we have shown that, 
in situations where distributions are heavily 
skewed due to historical injustices such as 
apartheid, Nozick’s entitlement theory is of 
little use. While Nozick supports the need for 
redress in situations where the principles of 
justice in acquisition and transfer have been 
flouted, his principle of rectification cannot tell 
us what we ought to do in situations where it 
is difficult to determine what the distributional 
situation would have been in the absence of 
previous injustice. In these situations, Nozick 
suggests that we may be justified in adopting 
Rawlsian principles in order to address these 
issues. However, this implies abandoning, at 
least in the short term, the libertarian premises 
on which his theory is based.
We have also, however, demonstrated 
that Rawls’s theory, which is premised on 
procedural fairness and equal liberty, can 
only normatively ground Category 1 and 
2 interventions in ideal circumstances, and 
Category 1, 2, and 3 interventions in non-ideal 
circumstances. Category 4 and 5 interventions, 
which advocate the use of soft and hard quotas 
respectively, and which are legally prescribed 
in the Employment Equity Act (1998), are – at 
least from the perspective of Rawls’s egalitarian 
theory – morally unjustifiable. The quota 
system suspends fair equality of opportunity 
in the name of securing equal liberties, but this 
represents a violation of procedural justice. The 
use of soft and hard quotas, therefore, cannot 
guarantee the justness of distributive outcomes, 
since these outcomes are themselves the 
consequence of unfair procedures, and because 
we have insufficient information about what 
the outcome of a counterfactual fair procedure 
would have looked like.
Faced with this argument, we are left with two 
possible outcomes: either we reject Rawls’s 
conclusion on the basis that his theory is 
insufficient and simply does not go far enough 
in providing a normative foundation for the 
types of interventions (i.e. quotas) that are 
deemed necessary in order to secure race-
based equality in a country like South Africa, 
or we accept Rawls’s conclusion and reject the 
quota system for the reason that there is no 
sound moral justification for endorsing such 
a system. In this latter case, we would need to 
explore alternative means for the rectification 
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of inequality. It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to give proper attention to these two 
alternatives. However, we offer the following 
provisional remarks in this regard.
The first alternative (i.e. the rejection of the 
Rawlsian position) necessarily implies that we 
need to find different criteria for grounding 
affirmative action policies. Apart from the 
equality argument, one popular argument 
often cited in support of affirmative action 
interventions is the diversity argument. Indeed, 
the landmark ruling in the Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakkes, in the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 1978, upheld affirmative action 
as one of several factors in college admission 
policies on the basis of the diversity argument. 
Similarly, the South African Employment 
Equity Act (1998:1) also cites diversity as one 
of the justifications for the Act, stating in the 
preface that affirmative action is necessary “in 
order to achieve a diverse workforce broadly 
representative of our people.”
However, as Benatar (2008:288) has argued, “[t]
he more extreme the form of affirmative action 
the less it can be supported by the diversity 
argument.” Given the fact that quota systems 
infringe on fair equality of opportunity, we are 
also of the opinion that a stronger criterion 
than that of diversity needs to be put forward 
in order to legitimise such infringements. 
Since the diversity argument is based on 
utilitarian as opposed to deontological grounds, 
in that it appeals to the value of diversity as 
a desirable outcome, it also cannot provide 
moral justification for the quota system, given 
the Constitutional enshrinement of moral 
equality before the law (which is clearly based 
on a deontological principle, rather than the 
utilitarian principle of the greater good). We 
therefore conclude that, in comparison to the 
equality argument, the diversity argument is 
weak. This is because the cost of forsaking the 
liberal values that undergird Rawls’s theory 
and the South African Constitution, in order 
to promote a narrowly-conceptualised view of 
diversity, is too high.
Given this argument, we prima facie reject 
alternative one in favour of alternative two: 
we accept the Rawlsian conclusion that quota 
systems are morally unjustifiable, but we also 
strongly support the need for rectification 
of historical injustices, and, therefore, the 
exploration of alternative channels for 
restitution and redress. One such a channel is 
education. 
Admittedly, the call for educational reform and 
the promotion of quality education is made 
often and loudly, but this does not detract from 
the urgent imperative to address this issue. In 
an article titled Poverty and inequality after 
apartheid, Jeremy Seekings (2007:13) states 
that, after unemployment, “[e]ducation is a 
second immediate cause of income poverty and 
inequality.” He argues that factors such as low-
grade attainment and inadequately developed 
numeracy and literacy skills mean that most 
young South African school leavers are not 
equipped for semi-skilled or, especially, skilled 
employment. The main reason for this state of 
affairs is the poor quality of education in many 
South African schools, which he attributes to 
inadequate teaching conditions, inequalities 
in family backgrounds, inequalities in the 
classroom, and the constant restructuring of 
the curriculum post-1994. He further argues 
that low-quality education translates into 
“unemployment among the unskilled, and 
low earnings among those unskilled workers 
who are lucky enough to find jobs” (2007:15). 
As with inequality and poverty generally, the 
levels of education in South Africa are strongly 
correlated with race. In this regard, Servaas van 
der Berg (2011:135) notes that “[s]ome two-
thirds of the white matric-aged cohort complete 
matric, versus just over one-quarter of the black 
cohort, [and that] [i]f educational quality is 
considered, differences [between races] are even 
larger, as access to quality education remains 
highly skewed.” Like Seekings, Van der Berg 
(2011:135) also remarks on the consequence of 
this situation, noting that “[e]specially among 
the young, many not completing high school 
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are effectively excluded from the economic 
mainstream, given the way the labour market 
interprets educational attainment.”
It is evident that there is “a serious mismatch 
between the supply and demand for labour” 
(Seekings, 2007:15), and that this mismatch 
is primarily due to low-quality education 
(specifically amongst previously disadvantaged 
groups). Our contention and our conclusion 
is therefore that – given the high levels of 
inequality and unemployment in South 
African society, and the low level of skills 
in the labour market – business has a moral 
duty, as well as an instrumental reason, for 
helping to address this mismatch. We believe 
that the most effective way in which to do 
so is for business to invest in, and directly 
support, the educational sector and educational 
initiatives more strongly, and to ensure that 
equality and equal opportunity are furthered 
in the workplace through the implementation 
of affirmative action measures that seek to 
eliminate employment barriers (Category  1), 
to promote and enforce impartiality and an 
attitude of non-discrimination in the workplace 
(Category  2), and to remove extraneous 
constraints that hamper fair competition of 
previously disadvantaged groups (Category  3).
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